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FEBRUARY, 1922 No. 4 
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN 1920-1921, IV1 
VI. RETROACTIVE CIVIL LEGISLATION 
W HILE the Constitution does not in terms forbid the United States, as it forbids the states, to pass any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts, the principle has become established that con-
tracts made by the United States may create rights of which indi-
viduals may not be divested. This principle is attached to the 
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against depriving any person of 
property without due process of law. In applying this principle, 
United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.2 held that a grant of 
land to a railroad to induce its construction is a contract, and that 
provisions for substituting indemnity lands to supply losses "in the 
place limits" confer substantial rights under the protection of the 
due-process clause. Government authorities had issued patents for 
certain indemnity lands which they later sought to revoke because 
before issue the land in question had been withdrawn for the crea-
tion of a forest reserve. The company resisted revocation on the 
ground that at the time of the withdrawal there was not enough 
indemnity land left to make up for the lpsses in the place limits. 
The court held that the government cannot defeat its original grant 
by withdrawing indemnity lands when there are not enough other 
indemnity lands left to enable it to comply with that grant, and that 
the general rule that no right attaches to any specific land until it 
1s "selected" does not apply as between the government and the 
1 For the preceding installments reviewing cases on Miscellaneous National 
Powers, Regulation of Commerce, Taxation, Police Power, and Eminent 
Domain, see 20 MICH. L. Rsv. I-23, I35-I72, 26I-288 (November and Decem-
ber, I92I; January, I922). 
2 256 U. S. 5I, 4I Sup. Ct. 439 (I92I). 
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grantee when the lands available for indemnity are not sufficient 
for that purpose. There was doubt as to the quantity of indemnity 
land remaining at the time of the withdrawal in question, and the 
case was sent back for determination of the facts. 
In three other cases, parties who relied on contracts with the 
federal government to defeat unwelcome action were unable to con-
vince the court that they had the contractual rights asserted. Chase 
v. United States3 involved an Indian who claimed a vested right 
to select eighty acres of land under an act of 1882 as. against a 
later act of 1912 which stood in his way. Mr. Justice McKenna 
contented himself with declaring that "the contention is one that 
has often been made in this court and rejected as often as made," 
and with citing previous cases. The ground seems to be that the 
statute relied on created no rights in individual Indians. In Mis-
souri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. United States4 a carrier who objected 
to a reduction of its compensation for carrying the mails was 
-----. 
reminded that the contract on which it relied was made subject to 
all postal laws and regulations which were then or might later 
become applicable, and that it was absurd for it to suppose that it 
, might, as it did, "discontinue an important item of the services 
upon which the compensation was computed, and still demand the 
same pay." District of Columbia v. R. P. Andrews Paper Co.'j 
allowed the District to charge rent for vaults under the sidewalk, 
holding that the original permits were revocable licenses and not 
contracts, and that the District is not restricted to the charges and 
regulations in force at the time the permit was granted. 
The two decisions sustaining rent regulation applied the familiar · 
principle that contracts between private parties are subject to appro-
priate exercises of the police power and that this liability is a part 
of their obligation which -therefore is not impaired when the police 
power is exercised. Block v. Hirsh6 sustained the law passed by 
Congress for the District of Columbia. The majority opinion said 
nothing about -the obligation of contracts, but the minority insisted 
that "a contract existing, its obligation is impregnable." In Marcus 
a 256 U. S. 3, 41 Sup. Ct. 417 (1921). 
4256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 617 (1921). 
5 256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 54S (1921). 
s256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921), 20 MrcH. L. REv. 274. 
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Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,7 which sustained the New York 
rent laws, Mr. Justice Holmes for the majority said: "But con-
tracts are made subject to this exercise of the power of the state, 
when othenvise justified, as we have held this to be." Of the cases 
cited in support, Mr. Justice McKenna for the minority observed 
that "there is not a line in any of them that declares that the explicit 
and definite covenants of private individuals engaged in a private-
and personal matter are subject to impairment' by a state law." 
The proper meaning of this is that the rent laws are not proper 
exercises of the police power, since 'they deal with purely private 
matters. Mr. Justice McKenna himself in sustaining a law requir-
ing employers to substitute contributions in a state fund for private 
insurance, in Thornton v. Ditffy8 declared that "an exercise of 
public policy cannot be resisted because of conduct or contracts 
done or made upon the faith of former exercises of it upon the 
ground that its later exercises deprive of property or invalidate 
those contracts." He also wrote the opinion in Walls v. Midland 
Carbon Co.,O which passed over in silence the objection that a statute· 
forbidding the use of natural gas for making carbon black impaired 
previous contracts for the sale of carbon black. In Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,1° which compelled 
construction of underpasses to remove grade crossings, Mr. Justice 
Holmes remarked that "contracts made by the road are made sub-
ject to the possible exercise of the sovereign right." 
. These cases might lead to the inference that past contracts never 
may stand in the way of the application of state police measures; 
but we know that one of the earliest decisions on the obligation-
of-contracts clause prohibited a state from applying a bankruptcy 
law to debts created prior to its enactment. This decision is one 
of the authorities relied on by Mr. Justice McReynolds in Bank of 
Minden v. Clenient11 for the conclusion that the exemption laws of 
7256 U.S.-, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (I921). 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 278. In 5 MINN. 
L. R.Ev. 474 this case is considered from the standpoint of the obligation-of-
contracts clause. 
8 254 U.S. 361, 4I Sup. Ct. 137 (1920), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 267. 
9 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct. n8 (I920), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 26x. 
10 254 U. S. 394. 4I Sup. Ct. I6g ( I921), 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 283. 
11256 U.S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 408 (192I). See 2I Cor.uM. L. R.Ev. 5g8, and 
8 VA. L. R.Ev. 58. 
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a state cannot deprive creditors of assets to which they were entitled 
under the law at the time the indebtedness arose. A Louisiana law 
of r9r4 provided that insurance policies payable to the estate of the 
assured shall be exempt from attachment for his debts. Before 
this the late Mr. Clement had borrowed money and had taken out 
insurance payable to his estate. Under the law then applicable the 
policies payable to his estate became his property subject to the 
claims of his creditors. Without any analysis of the problem other 
than that to be inferred from citation of decisions and quotation 
from opinions, Mr. Justice McReynolds declares that "so far as 
the statute of r9r4 undertook to exempt the policies and their pro-
ceeds from antecedent debts it came into conflict with the federal 
Constitution." Mr. Justice Clarke dissented.12 
In two cases complainants were unable to establish the contracts 
relied on to defeat police measures. The much-litigated Detroit 
street railroad controversy came before the court again in Detroit 
United Ry. v. Detroit.13 It previously had been decided that the 
original franchise of the road had expired, but the company claimed 
contractual rights in ordinances permitting it to continue to do 
business. These ordinances expressly declared that the permits 
granted might be revoked and that action under the so-called day-
to-day agreement should not waive the rights of the city or of the 
company. A decree in the state court fixing the terms of temporary 
operation stated that it should not affect the fundamental .rights of 
12 For discussions of various phases of the problem of retroactive civil 
legislation, see Nathan Isaacs, "John Marshall on Contracts: A Study in 
Early American Juristic Theory," 7 VA. L. Rev. 4I3; C. Brewster Rhoads, 
"The Police Power as a Limitation upon the Contractual Right of Public 
Service Corporations," 69 U. PA. L. R1"v. 3I7; William Trickett, "Is a Grant 
a Contract?" 54 AM. L. Rev. 7I8, 25 DICKINSON L. Rev. 3I; E. J. Verlie, 
"Retrospective Legislation in Illinois," 3 ILL. L. BULL. 28; and notes in I9 
MICH. L. R1"v. 112, 547, on the power of the state to raise rates fixed by 
contract between a city and the carrier; in 6 CoRN1"LL L. Q. 432, I9 MICH. L. 
Rev. 866, and 30 YAL~ L. J. 862, 869, on the constitutionality of statutes per-
mitting arbitration when agreed upon in a contract; in 34 HARV. L. Rev. on 
validating unauthorized collection of canal tolls; and in 30 YALE L. J. 759 on 
whether a vested right is created by a statute permitting the condemnee of 
land to repurchase after the abandonment of the public use for which it was 
taken. 
13 255 U. S. I7I, 4I Sup. Ct. 285 (I921), 20 M1cH. L. Rev. 285. 
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the parties. These stipulations were found sufficient to defeat the 
claim that the company had a contractual right to continue. A 
claim of estoppel was negatived because, at the time of the acts of 
the city relied on to create the estoppel, . the state constitution for-
bade the grant of an irrevocable franchise except upon the affirm-
ative vote of three-fifths of the electors, which vote had not been 
taken. Therefore the company might be ordered to remove its 
tracks and there was no impediment in the the way of the city's pro-
ceeding to construct or acquire tracks for a municipal road. 
The statute involved in International Bridge Co. v. New York14 
required the construction of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway 
for pedestrians on a railroad bridge of a company whose original 
charter permitted but did not command such accommodations. The 
change from permission to compulsion was held to be justified by 
the reserved power to amend the charter. It appeared also that 
an intervening statute permitting the consolidation of two bridge 
companies subjected the new corporation to all the duties of each 
of the consolidated companies. One of these companies had a Can-
adian charter which required the construction of a roadway and 
pathway. To the contention that this requirement was confined to 
the Canadian part of the bridge, Mr. Justice Holmes replied that 
"it would be quibbling with the rational understanding of the duty 
assumed to say that the company could have supposed that it had 
a contract or property right to confine its building of the foot-path 
and carriage-way to the Canadian side of the boundary line." A 
question as to the amount of the fees authorized to be charged for 
these new accommodations was put to one side as not connected 
with the issue whether the accommodations might be required, since 
the fees might be raised if at any time they proved too low. 
It is familiar that legislative exemptions from taxation may be 
contracts which the state may not later impair, but that the courts 
lean strongly against finding a contract. This strong leaning finds 
illustration in Troy Union R.R. Co. v. Mealy.15 In 1852, a city and 
14 254 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 56 ( 1920), 20 MICH. L. Rsv. 140,i 285. Chief 
Justice White and Justices McKama and McReynolds dissented, but did not 
indicate their objections. 
iG 254 U. S. 47, 41 Sup. Ct. 17 (1920). See 34 HARV. L. Riw. 541, 553, 
19 MICH. L. REv. 438, and 30 YALE L. J. 427. 
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four railroads formed a corporation to erect a union station under 
a contract in which the city covenanted to try to get the legislature 
to limit the assessment of the station to $30,000, the capital of the 
corporation, and in case the legislature did not do so, to refund 
city taxes on any amount exceeding $30,000. In 1853 the legisla-
ture passed a statute providing that the property of the corporation 
should be assessed at the amount of the capital stock of the com-
pany, and no more. In 1886 and 1887 the city sought to assess the 
station for more than twenty times the agreed $30,000, but it was 
held by the 5tate court that it could not do so. In 1909, however, 
the act of 1853 was repealed and the city thereafter tried again to 
escape the $30,000 limit. The case as it came 1.o the Supreme Court 
involved only the question whether the statute of 1853 was a con-
tract. As to that, Mr. Justice Holmes declared : 
"The Court of Appeals held that the concession in the act 
of 1853 was spontaneous and belonged to the class of privi-
legia favorabilia, * * * and therefore was subject to repeal. 
This is a question upon which we should be slow to differ 
with a decision of the New York courts with regard to a 
New York corporation. It may be that too much stress was 
laid upon the absence of a consideration for the exemption, 
* * * and that a fairly strong argument could be made for 
interpreting the grant of 1853 as purporting to be co-exten-
sive with the contract recited in that grant, whether correctly 
recited or not. * * * But taking into consideration the general 
attitude of the courts toward claims of exemption, adverted 
to by the Court of Appeals, the fact that the agreement of 
1858 shows that the parties concerned did not suppose that 
they had an ir_revocable grant, and especially the fact that 
the constitution of New York in force in 1853 provided in 
Article VIII, Section l, that all general laws and special acts 
passed pursuant to that section might be altered or repealed, 
we are not prepared to say that the decision below was 
wrong." 
The agreement of 1858 to which Mr. Justice Holmes refers was , 
one in which foreclosure proceedings brought by the city were 
dropped and the city agreed that if the act of 1853 should be repealed 
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it would join in an application to the legislature to renew the exemp-
tion, and again covenanted that if the desired law was not passed 
it would refund city taxes in excess of $30,000, as before. Whether 
the city could be made liable for a refund on this agreement was 
not passed upon in the court below and so was not considered by 
the Supreme Court. 
Sometimes it is the state which relies on contracts entered into 
by individuals or corporations in order to defeat objections to 
requirements which the state later imposes. · It is well established 
that charter provisions with regard to the fares to be charged by 
railroads may be contracts binding on both parties so that the com-
pany may defeat attempts to lower the fares or the state may insist 
that the fares fixed in the contract must continue even though they 
become so unremunerative that they could not be imposed as an 
exercise of the police power. In two cases in which rates previ-
ously fixed by cities had become confiscatory with the rise in cost 
of operations the cities contended unsuccessfully that the rates had 
been fixed by contract and that therefore the companies continued 
to be bound by them. In Soiqtltern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton1e 
Chief Justice White stated the applicable principles as. follows : 
"Two propositions are indisputable: (a) That although 
the governmental agencies having authority to deal with the 
subject may fix and enforce reasonable rates to be paid public 
utility corporations for the services by them rendered, that 
power does not include the right to fix rates which are so 
low as to be confiscatory of the property of such corpora-
tions '~ * ':'; and (b) that where, however, the public service 
corporations and the governmental agencies dealing with 
them have power to contract as to rates to govern during a 
particular time, the enforcement of such rates is controlled 
by the obligation resulting from the contract, and therefore 
the question of whether such rates are confiscatory becomes 
immaterial." 
The city here relied on a provision in the franchise ordinance which 
limited the fares to be charged. The decision that this limitation 
16 255 U. S. 539, 41 Sup. Ct. 400 (1921), 20 M1cH. L. Riw. 28I. See I9 
MICH. L. Riw. 886, and 20 MICH. L. ~v. 224. 
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was not contractual in nature but merely an exercise of legislative 
power was based on a line of Iowa decisions. holding that the legis-
lature had withheld from cities the power to contract. One of these 
cases was squarely in point, as it had allowed a company to raise 
rates above the limit fixed in the ordinance granting its franchise. 
Tlie issue in San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service Co.11 
was more complicated. In 1899, when the company acquired its 
franchise under an ordinance fixing a five-cent fare, the Texas 
constitution provided. that "no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant 
of special privileges or immunities shall be made, but all privileges 
and franchises granted by the legislature or created under its 
authority shall be subject to the control thereof." The Texas court 
had held that this left the legislature free to require half-fares for 
school children, notwithstanding a franchise prescription of a five-
cent fare. Chief Justice White assumes that what is not sauce for 
the company is not sauce for the city and that if the hands of the 
state are not tied the hands of the roads are also free from any 
contract obligation. The contention to the contrary is disposed of 
as follows: 
"And this is true, also, of the suggestion, made in argu-
ment, that, although no contract was possible under the con-
stitutional restriction which would bind the city not to lower 
the rate, nevertheless there was a unilateral contract or con-
dition, resulting from the granting of the franchise, which 
bound the railway company to the franchise rate, since again 
there is not the slightest suggestion of any attempt on the 
part of the parties to produce such a condition. But, besides, 
the error underlying the proposition is not far to seek. The 
duty of an owner of private property used , for the public 
service to charge only a reasonable rate, and thus respect the 
authority of government to regulate in the public interest, 
and of government to regulate by fixing such a reasonable 
rate as will safeguard the rights of private ownership, are 
interdependent and reciprocal. Where, however, the right 
to contract exists, and the parties, the public on the one hand 
and the private on the other, do so contract, the law of the 
11255 U. S. 547, 4I Sup. Ct. 428 (r92r), 20 MICH. L. Riw. 28r. See 20 
MICH. L. Rev. 224-
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contract governs both the duty of the private owner and the 
governmental power to regulate. Where, therefore, as in 
the case supposed in the argument, the -regulating power of 
government being wholly uncontrolled by contract, it would 
follow that that power would be required to be exerted and 
hence the supposed condition operating upon the private 
owner would be nugatory. Such a case really presents no 
question of a condition, since it resolves itself into a mere 
issue of the exercise by the government of its regulatory 
power." 
It appeared further that after 1912, the city had power to contract 
and that in consenting to a consolidation of companies into the 
complainant company the city stipulated that the new concern 
should be subject to the limitations, duti~s, and obligations which 
rested on the original companies. This was held not to convert the 
original fare limitation into a contract. It is worthy of note that 
the case originated in the federal court and that the decision pro-
fesses to be based on the law of the state as laid down by the state 
court. The Texas court had never held that the companies were 
not bound by the terms of their franchises, but only that the state 
was not bound. The former does not necessarily follow from the 
latter. It is quite possible that state courts will hold that franchise 
provisions are contractual conditions on the rights of the recipient 
though not on the power of the grantor; i. e., that the permission 
granted to the railroad is limited to the designated fare even though 
neither the city nor the legislature could bind itself not to exercise 
its regulatory power to reduce the fare. If this happens we shall 
have a different situation from that presented in the San Antonio 
case. The Supreme Court may then follow the state court on a 
matter of state law, or it may hold the state decision erroneous, 
as it frequently does when it thinks that state courts have in effect 
allowed the impairment of the obligation of contracts by unwar-
rantably holding that no contract existed or that its provisions do 
not preclude the legislation complained of. The Supreme Court· 
would be likely to follo:w a long line of state decisions that cities 
had power to contract and had contracted, but to look askance at 
a new decision which it thought the complainant was not reasonably 
bound to anticipate. 
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VII. IMMUNITIES OF PERSONS CHARGED WITH CRIME 
r. Searches and Seizures 
Though the Fourth Amendment declares that the right of the 
people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated, it provides for no machinery for enforcing the guar-
anty. The methods of enforcement worked out by the courts 
include the granting of petitions for the return of papers and effects 
wrongfully taken and the exclusion of such papers from use as evi-
dence against their rightful possessor. The second form of pro-
tection is based in part on the so-called-privilege against self-incrim-
ination conferred by the declaration of the Fifth Amendment that 
no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself. Apparently also the granting of petitions for the 
return of papers is sometimes based on the Fifth as well as on the 
Fourth Amendment. The two amendments are so joined in the 
opinions of the past term that cases based on both are not securely 
to be taken as interpretations of either alone. The separation here 
indulged in may therefore be open to suspicion, but it is neverthe-
less ventured in the hope that it may perhaps be serviceable and that 
this warning to the reader will put him on his guard against being 
misled. 
Biirdeait v. M cDowell18 involved a petition asking for an order 
to a prosecuting attorney to return certain papers which had been 
stolen from the petitioner by agents of his employer and by them 
turned over to the government to be used in proceedings before the 
grand jury. In justifying the denial of the petition Mr. Justice Day 
declared: 
"The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful 
searches and seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, 
its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and 
history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon 
the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to 
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies ; as 
against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested 
l!\256 U. S. -, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921). See 22 Cor.uM. L. Riw. 77, 35 
HARV. L. Riw. 84 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 353, 6 MINN. L. R.Ev. 70, 7 VA. L. REG. 
n. s. 288, and 31 YAI.E L. J. 335. 
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occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, 
subject to the right of seizure by process duly issued. 
In the present case the record clearly shows that no official 
of the federal government had anything to do with the 
wrongful seizure of the petitioner's property, or any knowl-
edge thereof until several months after the property had 
been taken from him and was in the possession of the Cities 
Service Company. It is manifest that there was no invasion 
of the security afforded by the Fourth Amendment against 
unreasonable searches and seizure, as whatever was done was 
the act of individuals in taking the property of another. A 
portion of the property so taken and held was turned over 
to the prosecuting officers of the federal government. We 
assume that petitioner has an unquestionable right of redress 
against those who illegally and wrongfully took his private 
property under the circumstances here disclosed, but with 
such remedies we are not now concerned." 
A dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurred in by Mr. 
Justice Holmes, thought that such irregular acquisition ought not 
to make the government's possession of the papers rightful even 
though no provision of the Constitution requires their surrender. 
Among the papers involved in Gouled v. United States19 was one 
that had been stolen from the accused by agents of the Intelligence 
Department of the United States Army and by them turned over 
to a federal prosecuting officer and used against the defendant at 
his trial. In holding that this taking was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment Mr. Justice Clarke observed: 
"The prohibition of the Fourth Amendment is against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and if for a government 
officer to obtain entrance to a man's house or office by force 
or by an illegal threat or show of force, amounting to coer-
cion, and then to search . for and seize his private papers 
would be an unreasonable search and seizure, as it certainly 
would be, it is impossible to successfully contend that a like 
search and seizure would be a reasonable one if only admis-
sion· were obtained by stealth instead of by force and coer-
10 255 U. S. 2g8, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921). See 5 MINN. L. REv. 465, and 
30 YAr.t L. J. 769. 
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cion. The security and privacy of the home or office and of 
the papers of the owner would be as much invaded and the 
search and seizure would be as much against his will in the 
one case as in the other, and it must therefore be regarded 
as equally in violation of his constitutional rights. 
Without discussing them, we cannot doubt that such deci-
sions as there are in conflict with this conclusion are unsound, 
and that, whether entrance to the home or office of a person 
suspected of crime be obtained by a representative of any 
branch or subdivision of the government of the United 
States by stealth, or through social acquaintance, or in the 
guise of a business call, and whether the owner be present 
or not when he enters, any search and seizure subsequently 
and secretly made in his absence, falls within the scope of 
the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment." 
The other papers involved in the case had been taken under search 
warrants accompanied by affidavits which, so far as appeared, suf-
ficiently described the papers to be seized. The question whether 
the seizure was reasonable was said to depend upon whether the 
papers were wanted merely as aids in securing the conviction of 
the accused or because their retention by their possessor was in 
itself unlawful or was an aid in his nefarious enterprise. This con-
trast was set forth by Mr. Justice Clarke as follows: 
"The wording of the Fourth Amendment implies that 
search warrants were in familiar use when the Constitution 
was adopted and, plainly, that when issued 'upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the places to be searched and the persons or things 
to be seized,' searches, and seizures made under them, are to 
be regarded as not unreasonable, and therefore not prohib-
ited by the amendment. Searches and seizures are as con-
stitutional under the amendment when made under valid 
search warrants as they are unconstitutional, because unrea-
sonable, when made without them-the permission of the 
amendment has the same constitutional warrant as the pro-
hibition has, and the definition of the former restrains the 
scope of the latter. All this is abundantly recognized in the 
opinions of the Boyd and Weeks Cases, supra, in which it is 
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pointed out that at the time the Constitution was adopted 
stolen or forfeited property, or property liable to duties and 
concealed to avoid payment of them, excisable articles and 
books required by law to be kept with respect to them, coun-
terfeit coin, burglars' tools and weapons, implements of gam-
bling 'and many other things of like character' might be 
searched for in home or office and if found might be seized 
under search warrants, lawfully applied for, issued and exe-
cuted. 
Although search warrants have thus ·been used in many 
cases ever since the adoption of the Constitution, and although 
their use has been extended from time to time to meet new 
cases within the old rules, nevertheless it is clear that, at 
common law and as the result of the Boyd and Weeks Cases, 
sitpra, they may not be used as a means of gaining access to 
a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of 
making search to secure evidence to be used against him in 
criminal or penal proceedings, but that they may be resorted 
to only when a primary right to such search and seizure may 
be found in the interest which the public or the complainant 
may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the 
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power 
renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful 
and provides that it may be taken." 
As the certificate of the circuit court of appeals failed to show that 
the government had any interest in the seized papers other than as 
evidence against the accused, the seizure was held unlawful and the 
use of the paper as evidence after due objection was held a viola-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
The property involved in Amos v. United States20 was whiskey 
taken without any warrant by revenue officers from the home of 
the defendant in his absence. His wife was present and made no 
resistance to the search, but the court found "implied coercion" on 
the part of the officers and declared that it was therefore unneces-
sary to consider whether the constitutional immunity of the husband 
might be waived by his wife. The conviction was set aside because 
20 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (1921). See 5 MINN. L. Rsv. 465. 
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of the wrongful refusals of the trial judge to exclude the whiskey 
as evidence and to strike out the testimony of the revenue officers 
as to their search and its results. The questions as to the introduc-
tion of the evidence in this case and in the Gou..Zed Case will be con-
sidered more in detail in the paragraphs dealing with the privilege 
against self-incrimination.21 
2. Self Incrimination 
It is now established that the privilege against self-incrimination 
includes immunity from the use against an ~ccused of papers taken 
from hi~ by an unconstitutional search and seizure. There has in 
the past been some uncertainty as to what steps must be taken on 
behalf of the accused to enable him to take advantage of this 
immunity. Some cases have seemed to indicate that a petition 
before trial for the return of the papers is a necessary prerequisite 
to an objection to their introduction in evidence. This requirement 
is somewhat relaxed by the decisions handed down at the last term 
of court. In Gouled v: United States22 one of the papers introduced 
in evidence had been stolen from the defendant by a government 
agent. The accused was ignorant of the theft and so could not 
petition for its return before trial. In answering the question cer-
tified by the circuit court of appeals whether the taking of the 
paper was a wrongful search and seizure, Mr. Justice Clarke 
assumed that one of the grounds on which the trial court overruled 
an objection to the introduction of the paper in evidence against 
the accused was that his objection came too late. To this he 
answered that "the objection was not too late, for, coming as it did 
promptly upon the first notice the defendant had that the govern-
ment was in possession of the paper, the rule of practice relied upon, 
that such an objection will not be entertained unless made before 
trial, was obviously inapplicable." It must be regarded by the court 
as equally inapplicable to the issue whether the accused was in a 
21 The use of evidence obtained by wrongful search and seizure is con-
sidered in Osmond K. Frankel, "Concerning Searches and Seizures," 34 
HARV. L. RJW. 361 ; and notes in 15 ILL. L. RJW. 393, 19 MICH. L. REv. 355, 
and 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 850. In 21 CoLUM. L. RJW. 291 is a note on a case 
holding that contraband property need not be returned even after seizure 
under an insufficient warrant. 
22 Note 19, supra. 
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position to daim immunity from the use of the paper under the 
Fifth Amendment, since immunity under that amendment was 
affirmed in the decision. On this point Mr. Justice Clarke said: 
"In pra~tice the result is the same to one accused of crime, 
whether he be obliged to supply evidence against himself or 
whether such evidence be obtained by an illegal search of 
his premises and seizure of his private papers. In either 
case he is the unwilling source of the evidence, and the Fifth 
Amendment forbids that he shall be compelled to be a wit-
ness against himself in a criminal case." 
Other papers in the case were seized under a search warrant held 
invalid because issued primarily to obtain evidence against the 
accused. The introduction of these papers in evidence was held an 
infringement of the immunity against self-incrimination. A peti-
tion for return of the papers had been filed before trial and denied. 
In holding that the trial court should upon objection to the intro-
duction of the evidence consider anew whether the papers had 
rightfully come into the possession of the government Mr. Justice 
Clarke said: 
"The papers being of 'evidential value only' and having 
been unlawfully seized, this question really is whether, it 
having been decided on a motion before trial that they should 
not be returned to the defendant, the trial court, when objec-
tion was made to their use on the trial, was bound to again 
inquire as to the unconstitutional origin of the possession of 
them. It is plain that the trial court acted upon the rule, 
widely adopted, that courts in criminal trials will not pause 
to determine how the possession of the evidence has been 
obtained. While this is a rule of great practical importance, 
yet, after all, it is only a rule of procedure and therefore it 
is not to be applied as a hard and 'fast formula to every case, 
regardless of its special circumstances. We think rather that 
it is a rule to be used to secure the ends of justice under the 
circumstances presented by each case, and where, in the prog-
ress of a trial, it becomes probable that there has been an 
unconstitutional seizure of papers, it is the duty of the trial 
court to entertain an objection to their admission or a motion 
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for their exclusion and to consider and decide the question 
as then presented, even where a motion to return the papers 
may have been denied before trial. A rule of practice must 
not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a 
constitutional right. 
In the case we are considering the certificate shows that 
a motion to return the papers,, seized under the search war-
rants, was made before the trial and was denied, and that on 
the trial of the case before another judge, this ruling was 
treated as conclusive, although, as we have seen, in the prog-
ress of the trial it must have become apparent that the papers 
had been unconstitutionally seized. The constitutional objec-
tion having been renewed, under the circumstances, the court 
should have inquired as to the origin of the possession of the 
papers when they were offered in evidence against the defend-
ant." 
On its facts this case holds no more than that a petition before trial 
for return of papers is not a prerequisite to an objection to their 
introduction in evidence if knowledge of the government's wrongful 
possession is first acquired when the papers are offered in evidence, 
and that the wrongful denial of a petition before trial for return 
of papers does not conclude the issue and relieve the trial court of· 
inquiring whether the papers offered in evidence were rightly 
obtained. Some of Mr. Justice Clarke's language, however, goes 
further and implies, if it does not definitely state, that the trial 
court must consider an objection to the use of the papers in evidence 
whenever it is probable they were obtained by an unconstitutional 
search or seizure, thus dispensing with any prerequisite of petition 
before trial. 
That the Gouled case is understood by the court to go further 
than the facts required it to go seems evident from the reliance on 
it in Amos v. u~iited Sta.tes,23 decided on the same day, in which 
Mr. Justice.Clarke again wrote the opinion. Here the defendant's 
wife knew of the wrongful seizure by government officers at the 
time when it was made. There is no indication that the defendant 
was surprised by their testimony that they found the whiskey; his 
23 Note 20, supra. 
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advance knowledge that they had it is apparent from the fact that 
after the jury was impaneled and before it was introduced in evi-
dence he moved to have it returned to him. This motion was denied 
by the trial court, as was also a motion to strike out the testimony 
of the officers and to exclude the use of the whiskey as evidence. 
In holding these denials wrongful, Mr. Justice Clarke said: 
"The answer of the government to the claim that the trial 
court erred in the two rulings we have described is that the 
petition for the return of defendant's property was properly 
denied, be.cause it came too late when presented after the 
jury was impaneled and the trial, to that extent, commenced, 
and that the denial of the motion to exclude the property and 
the testimony of the government agents relating thereto, 
after the manner of the search of the defendant's home had 
been described, was justified by the rule that in the progress 
of the trial of criminal cases courts will not stop to frame a 
collateral issue to inquire whether evidence offered, othenvise 
competent, was lawfully or unlawfully obtained. Plainly 
.questions thus presented for decision are ruled by the con-
clusions this day announced in Feli:c Gouled v. United States." 
Thus the requirement of petition before trial has evaporated even 
when the facts necessary to make such a petition are known to the 
defendant. The Amos case plainly is unwarranted by the actual 
decision in the Gouled case. It goes beyond that case in requiring 
an objection to the introduction of evidence to be entertained. 
although a motion for return has not been filed until after the trial 
has technically begun. The "conclusions announced" in the Goided 
case are broad enough to dispense with any preliminary motion for 
return of the papers, and such broad conclusions seem to be the 
basis of the decision in the Amos case. Technically, however, it is 
still possible for the court to hold that some preliminary foundation 
must still be laid for an objection to the introduction of evidence 
wrongfully obtained. On its facts the Amos case goes no further 
than that a motion for return of papers is seasonable if made before 
the introduction of any evidence in the case. 
Another of the questions certified to the Supreme Court in the 
Gouled case assumed that the evidence was rightly obtained for a 
valid purpose under a valid warrant and inquired whether such 
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papers could be used in evidence against their owner when on trial 
for a different offense than that with which he was charged when 
the seizure was made. To this Mr. Justice Clarke replied: 
"It has never been required that a criminal prosecution 
should be pending against a person in order to justify search 
for and seizure of his property under a proper warrant, if a 
case of crime having been committed and of probable cause 
is made out sufficient to satisfy the law and the officer having 
authority to issue it, and we see no reason why property 
seized under a valid search warrant, when thus lawfully 
obtained by the government, may not be used in the prose-
cution of a suspected person for a crime other than that 
which may have been described in the affidavit as having been 
committed by him. The question assumes that the property 
seized was obtained on a search warrant sufficient in form to 
satisfy the law, and if the papers to which the question relates 
had been of a character to be thus obtained, lawfully, it would 
have been competent to use them to prove any crime against 
the accused to which they constituted relevant evidence." 
As we have seen, Burdeait v. M cDowell24 holds that the govern-
ment may rightfully acquire papers by gift from a thief, so far as 
the prohibition against searches and seizures is concerned. The 
case also holds that papers so acquired may be used against their 
owner in proceedings before the_ grand jury without violating the 
privilege against self-incrimination. On this point Mr. Justice Day 
says: 
"The Fifth Amendment, as its terms import is intended to 
secure the citizen from compulsory testimony against himself. 
It protects from e,"'Ctorted confessions, or examinations in 
court proceedings "by compulsory methods. 
The exact question to be decided here is : May the govern-
ment retain incriminating papers, coming to it in the manner 
described, with a view to their use in a subsequent investi-
gation by a grand jury where such papers will be part of the 
evidence against the accused, and may be used against him 
upon the trial should an indictment be returned? 
24 Note 0 18, supra. 
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We know of no constitutional principle which requires the 
government to surrender the papers under such circumstances. 
Had it learned that such incriminatory papers, tending to 
show a violation of federal law, were in the hands of a per-
son other than the accused, it having had no part in wrong-
fully obtaining them, we know of no reason why a subpoena 
might not issue for the production of the papers as evidence. 
Such production would require no unreasonable search or 
seizure, nor would it amount to compelling the accused to 
testify against himself. 
The papers having come into the possession of the govern-
ment without a violation of petitioner's rights by govern-
mental authority, we see no reason why the fact that indi-
viduals, unconnected with the government, may have wrong-
fully taken them, should prevent them for being held for use • 
in prosecuting an offense where the documents are of an 
incriminatory character. 
In dissenting Mr. Justice Brandeis said: 
"That the court would restore the papers to plaintiff if 
they were still in the thief's possession is not questioned. 
That it has power to control the disposition of these stolen 
papers, although they have passed into the possession of the 
law officer, is also not questioned. But it is said that no pro-
vision of the Constitution requires their surrender and that 
the papers could have been subpoenaed. This may be true. 
Still I cannot believe that action of a public official is neces-
sarily lawful because it does not violate constitutional pro-
hibitions and because the same result might have been attained 
by other and proper means. At the foundation of our civil 
liberty lies the principle which denies to government officials 
an exceptional position before the law and which subjects 
them to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 
citizen. And in the development of our liberty insistence 
upon procedural regularity has been a large factor. Respect 
for law will not be advanced by resort, in its enforcement, to 
means which shock the common man's sense of decency and 
fair play." 
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Mr. Justice Holmes joined in this dissent. 
The question in Arndstein v. McCan.th~s was whether the filing 
of schedules by a bankrupt in involuntary proceedings constitutes a 
waiver of his privilege against self incrimination with respect to 
questions with regard to them in bankruptcy proceedings when a 
statute provides that his answers to such questions may not be used 
against him in criminal proceedings. A negative answer is sup-
ported by Mr. Justice McReynolds as follows : 
"The schedules, standing alone, did not amount to an 
admission of guilt or furnish clear proof of crime, and the 
mere filing of them did not constitute a waiver of the right 
to stop short whenever the bankrupt could fairly claim that 
to answer might tend to incriminate hi.m. * * * It is impos-
sible to say from mere consideration of the questions pro-
pounded, in the light of the circumstances disclosed, that 
they could have been answered with entire impunity. * * * 
'No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against ~imself.' Fifth Amendment. 'This 
provision must have a broad construction in favor of the 
right which it was intended to secure.' 'The object was to 
secure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as 
a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might 
tend to show that he himself had committed a crime.' 
The protection of the Constitution was not removed by 
the provision in section 7 of the Bankruptcy Act: 'No testi-
mony given by him shall ·be offered in evidence against him 
in any criminal proceeding.' 'It could not and would not 
prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony 
to be used in evidence against him or his property.' " 26 
25 254 U. S. 71, 41 Sup. Ct. 26 (1920). Mr. Justice Day did not sit. Mr. 
Rufus R. Day was of counsel for Mr. Arndstein. 
26 The privilege against self-incrimination is considered in Ernest 
Bruncken, "Making the Accused Testify Against Himself," 5 MARQU~~ 
L. fuv. 82; and a note in 5 MINN. L. fuv. 475 on a, case holding that an 
assured may be compelled to submit to examination as to the cause of a 
fire when he has made an agreement to that effect in his contract of insurance. 
Constitutional provisions prescribing the place of trial are considered in 
5 MINN. L. R~. 148, 6g U. PA. L. fuv. 361, and 7 VtA. L. fuv. 313; arrest 
without warrant, in 15 ILL. L. fuv. 464; denial of public trial by excluding 
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3. Substantive Elements in Crime Charged 
(a) Freedom of Speech. A certain Mr. Gilbert told a Minnesota 
audience that they had had nothing to say about who should be 
president or governor or whether America should go into the war 
against Germany and that "we were stampeded into this war by 
newspaper rot to pull England's chestnuts out of the fire for her." 
For this he was convicted of violating a section of the Minnesota 
statute forbidding teaching or advocacy that the citizens of the state 
should not aid the United States in prosecuting a war against its 
enemies. In Gilbert v. MinnesotaP this conviction was held not to 
be an infringement of the right of free speech. Mr. Justice McKenna 
points out that, at the time the offending speech was made, the war 
was flagrant and armies were enlisti~g and that the purpose -of the 
speech was necessarily the discouragement of such enlistment. Thus 
indirectly he seems to answer the contention of Mr. Justice Bran-
deis's dissenting opinion that the state statute applied to times of 
peace as well as of war and that the section under which the indict-
ment was brought was so broad as to apply to fathers and mothers 
who in the privacy of their homes urged their sons not to enlist. 
The majority do not pass on the question whether the Fourteenth 
:Amendment restricts the states as the First Amendment restricts 
the United States, since they approve of the conviction under the 
state statute on the basis of decisions sustaining convictions under 
the federal espionage laws. Mr. Justice McKenna quoted with 
approval his own comments in an earlier opinion that "the curious 
public; including relatives of accused, in trial for statutory rape, in 5 MINN. 
L. Rlw. 554; a case holding that the right to assistance of counsel does not 
include privilege of discharging counsel and so of addressing the jury per-
sonally, in 5 MINN. L. Rlw. 553; waiver of privilege of confrontation of jury, 
in 19 MICH. L. Rlw. 439. 
Discussions of double jeopardy may be grouped as follows: appeal by 
state in criminal cases, in 19 MICH. L. Rtv. 79; previous conviction on void 
indictment, in 20 Car.UM. L. Rlw. 915, 69 U. PA. L. Rlw. 17I, and 30 YAI.£ 
L. J. 864; acquittal of murder as bar to indictment for involuntary man-
slaughter, in 69 u. p A. L. Rlw. 278; offenses against state and federal liquor 
laws, in 34 HARV. L. Rlw. 785 and 19 MICH. L. Rlw. 647; offenses against both 
state and city, in 7 VA. L. Riw. 636. 
21254 U.S. 325, 4I Sup. Ct. 125 (I920), 20 MICH. L. Rtv. 10, 265. See 
2I Car.UM. L. Rtv. 483, 15 kr.. L. Rlw. 530, 19 MICH. L. Rlw. 870, and 30 
YAU~ L. J. 623. 
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spectacle was presented of the Constitution of the United States 
·being invoked to justify the activities of anarchy or of the enemies 
of the United States, and by a strange perversion of its precepts it 
was adduced against itself," and he declared that every word that 
Mr. Gilbert "uttered in denunciation of the war was false, was a 
deliberate misrepresentation of the motives which impelled it, and 
the objects for which it was prosecuted," and that Mr. Gilbert knew 
that the war "was not declared in aggression, but in defense, in 
defense of our national honor, in vindication of the 'most sacred 
rights of our nation and our people.' "28 
(b) Indefiniteness of criminal statute. In a series of cases the 
so-called Lever Act by which Congress undertook as a war measure 
to regulate the prices of necessaries was declared unconstitutional 
for its failure sufficiently to specify any standard for determining 
whether the prices exacted were "excessive." Mr. Justice Pitney, 
with whom Mr. Justice Brandeis agreed, urged that the statute for-
bade only a conspiracy to exact excessive prices for necessaries and 
that the isolated acts of individuals could not be punished under this 
prohibition against conspiracy. He contended also that another 
section declaring it unlawful to make any unjust or unreasonable 
rate or: charges in the handling of necessaries is confined to charges 
for services and does not embrace the price for the sale of the goods, 
The majority found the words "broad enough to embrace the price 
at which a commodity is sold," but held that the words "unjust," 
"unreasonable" and "excessive" are so vague as to fail to inform 
persons accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against 
them within the prescription of the Sixth Amendment. The leading 
case was United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.29 in which Chief 
28 Discussions of freedom of speech appear in Edward S. Corwin, "Free-
dom of Speech and Press under the First Amendment,'' 30 ·YALE L. J. 4S; 
Herbert F. Goodrich, "Does the Constitution Protect Free Speech?" 19 MICH. 
L. REv. 4S7; James Parker Hall, "Free Speech in War Time," 21 Cox.mt. 
L. REv. 526; W. A. S., "Prosecutions under the Espionage Act and Lessons 
Therefrom," 24 LAW NOTES 165; and notes in 16 Iu. L. REv. 64 and 30 YALE 
L. J. 68, 861. 
29 255 U. S. Sr, 4r Sup. Ct. 29S (I92I), 20 MICH. L. REv. 9. See I6 Ir.r.. 
L. REv. 66, I9 MICH. L. REv. 648, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 3SI, 6 VA. L. Rile. n. s. 
935, and 30 YALE L. J. 639. For discussions prior to the Supreme Court 
decisions, see 2r Cor.u:i.r. L. REv. 394, r9 MICH. L. Ri!v. 337, 437, 5 MINN. L. 
REv. 2g8, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 56, and 30 YALE L. J. Sr, g8, 99. 
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Justice White referred to the failure of administrative officers and 
trial courts to agree as to any standard prescribed by the act and 
declared that the effect of enforcing it "would be the exact equiva-
lent of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms penalized and 
punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and 
unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury." Earlier cases 
relied on by the government were put to one side with the statement 
that, if the contention based on them were true, it would result that 
"no standard whatever was required, no information as to the nature 
and cause of the action was essential, and that it was competent to 
delegate legislative power, in the very teeth of the settled signifi-
cance of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and of other plainly 
applicable provisions of the Constitution." The Chief Justice ven-
tured the further point that in statutes previously sustained against 
the charge of indefiniteness "a standard of some sort was afforded." 
This decision was followed in Tedrow v. Lewis & Son, Co.,3° Ken-
nington v. Palmer,31 Kt1nnane v. Detroit Creamery Co.,32 Weed & 
Co. v. Lockwood,33 Willard Co. v. Palmer,34 Oglesby Grocery Co. v. 
United States,3G and Weeds Inc. v. United Sitates.36 Only in the last 
case did Justices Pitney and Brandeis think that the acts of the 
defendants were within the terms of the statute. This was a con-
spiracy for charging excessive prices. These two justices voted to 
reverse the conviction on the ground that the defendants had not 
been allowed to introduce evidence as to the market value of the 
goods sold, but Mr. Justice Pitney insisted that the statute was itself 
constitutional, since its prohibitions referred to the natural standard 
of market value, the price prevailing under current conditions of 
supply and demand uninfluenced by manipulation, which was the 
standard "adhered to by the common law time out of mind."37 
30 255 U. S. 98, 41 Sup. Ct. 303 ( 1921). 
31255 U. S. 100, 41 Sup. Ct. 303 ( 1921). 
3 2 255 U. S. 102, 41 Sup. Ct. 304 (1921). 
33 255 U. S. 104, 41 Sup. Ct. 305 (1921). 
34 255 U. S. 106, 41 Sup. Ct. 305 ( 1921). 
3G 255 U.S. 108, 41 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (19..i1). 
36 255 U. S. 109, 41 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (1921). 
a1 A case holding a municipal ordinance void for vagueness is treated in 
21 CoLuM. L. REV'. 390; a decision permitting the jury to pass on the reason-
ableness of speed, in 19 MICH. L. RJ;;v. 218. For a general discussion of the 
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( c) Guilty Knowledge of Defendant. A federal statute pun-
ishing the possession without lawful authority of any die in the 
likeness of a die designed for producing genuine coin of the United 
States was construed in Baender v. Barnett3s to apply only to "will-
ing and conscious possession." While this does not mean with any 
certainty that this restricted construction was essential to the con-
stitutionality of the statute, the result was based on the canon that 
a statute should be construed if possible so as to avoid "not only 
the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon 
that score."39 
4. Right of Trial by fary 
(a) Comment on Evidence. In a criminal case in the District of 
Columbia in which witnesses for the prosecution and the defense 
wholly agreed as to the facts, the court charged the jury that though 
he could not instruct them to bring in a verdict of guilty, a failure 
to do so could only arise from a flagrant disregard of the evidence, 
the law, and their obligation as jurors. This was held proper in 
Horning v. District of Columbia40 by a vote of five to four. Mr. 
Justice McReynolds announced his dissent, and Chief Justice White 
and Mr. Justice Day concurred in the dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Brandeis. This opinion insisted that "such a charge is a 
moral command; and, being- yielded to, substitutes the will of the 
judge for the conviction of the jury." For the majority Mr. Justice 
Holmes conceded that "perhaps there was a regrettable peremptori-
ness of tone," but he added that "the jury were allowed the tech-
nical right, if it can be called so, to decide against the law and the 
facts, and that is all there was left for them after the defendant 
and his witnesses took the stand." His further comment that "if 
the defendant suffered any wrong, it was purely formal, since, as 
we have said, there was no doubt of his guilt,'' brought from Mr. 
problem, see Ernst Freund, "The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes," 30 
YAI.r: L. J. 437. 
38 255 U. S. 224 4r Sup. Ct. 27r (r92r). See 30 YAI.E' L. J. 762. 
39 Substantive elements in criminal charges are considered in Emanuel 
R. Parnass, "Imprisonment for Civil Obligations in Illinois," rs ILL. L. R.Iw. 
559; and a note in 5 MINN. L. R.Iw. 458 on "Contempt-Civil and Criminal." 
40 254 U. S. r35, 4r Sup. Ct. 53 ( r920). See 2r CoLUM. L. Rr:v. 190, 34 
HARV. L. Rr:v. 442, r9 MrcH. L. Rr:v. 325, and 6 VA. L. R.i;:G. n. s. 776. 
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Justice Brandeis the retort: "Whether a defendant is found guilty 
by a jury, or is declared to be so by a judge, is not, under the fed-
eral Constitution, a mere formality. * * * Congress would have been 
powerless to provide for imposing the punishment except upon the 
verdict of the jury. * * * I find nothing in the act to indicate that 
it has sought to do so."41 
(b) Jurisdiction of Courts Martial. The requirement of the 
Fifth Amendment as to presentment or indictment of a grand jury 
specifically excepts "cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger." 
The jurisdiction of courts martial is therefore a constitutional ques-
tion. Kahn v. Anderson42 held that military prisoners are subject 
to trial by court martial even though the sentence being served at 
the time of the second offen.se in question included dismissal from 
the army. Givens v. Zerbst43 holds that when the jurisdiction of a 
court martial is attacked collaterally on habeas corpus proceedings 
because the record fails to state the jurisdictionary fact that the 
accused was an officer in the army, the attack may be met by evi-
dence to show the existence of a military status of the accused. 
General expressions to the contrary in prior opinions must, it was 
declared, be limited in accordance with the ruling now made, since 
"the complete right to collaterally assail the existence of every fact 
which was essential to the exercise by such a limited court of its 
authority, whether appearing on the face of the record or not, is 
wholly incompatible with the conception that, when a collateral 
attack is made, the face of the record is conclusive."44 
5. Interstate Rendition. 
In Hogan v. O'Neill45 a gentleman in cust9dy in New Jersey 
under a warrant from the governor of that state in response to a 
demand for rendition from the governor of Massachusetts sought 
41 The requisites of procedure before the grand jury are discussed in 21 
Cor.uM. L. Riw. 376; the effect of failure to administer the required oath to 
the jury, in 19 MICH. L. Riw. u5. 
42 255 U. S. I, 41 Sup. Ct. 224 (I92I), 20 MICH. L. Riw. 6. See 16 Ir.r.. 
L. Rsv. 67 and 30 Y.AI.~ L. J. 521. 
43 255 U. S. II, 41 Sup. Ct. 227 (1921), 20 MICH. L. Rmt. 6. 
44 The jurisdiction of courts martial is dealt with in 21 Cor.uM. L. Rsv. 
38o, 34 HARV. L. REY. 659, 673, and 16 Ir.r.. L. Rsv. 56. In 5 MINN. L. Rlw. 
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a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court on the ground 
that he was not charged with a crime in Massachusetts and was not 
a fugitive from that commonwealth. In approving of the discharge 
of the writ the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Pitney pointed 
out that the Massachusetts statute provided that the name of the 
county and the court in the caption of an indictment should be con-
sidered an allegation that the act of the accused was committed 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and that therefore 
the failure of the indictment to specify the fact did not make it 
guilty of failure to charge a crime. Failure to charge an overt act 
in Massachusetts was held unimportant since the crime of conspiracy 
might be committed without overt acts. On the question whether 
-the relator was a fugitive from Massachusetts his own evidence 
:Showed that he was within the state on or about the day charged in 
· the indictment as the time when the alleged crime was committed. 
Without referring to a possible question as to whether this presence 
in Massachusetts was before or after the commission of the crime, 
Mr. Justice Pitney declared: 
"Whether in fact he was a fugitive from justice was for 
the determination of the Governor of New Jersey. The war-
rant of arrest issued in compliance with the demand of the 
Governor of Massachusetts shows that he found appellant 
to be a fugitive; and this conclusion must stand unless clearly 
overthrown, which appellant has not succeeded in doing. To 
be regarded as a fugitive from justice it is not necessary that 
one shall have left the state in which the crime is alleged to 
have been committed for the very purpose of avoiding prose-
cution, but simply that, having committed there an act which 
by the law o.f the state constitutes a crime, he afterwards has 
departed from its jurisdiction and when sought to be prose-
cuted is found within the territory of another state."46 
, Columbia University. THOMAS REED POWELL. 
(To be concluded) 
540 is a note on court martial for civil offenses ; in 21 Cor,u:i.r. L. Rev. 477 
a discussion of the revision of the articles of war. 
45 255 U. S. 52, 41 Sup. Ct. 222 (1921). 
46 The issue when an accused is a fugitive is considered in 7 VA. L. R.Ev. 
150·; a case ho!ding a pardon not valid until delivered, in 34 HiARv. L. R.Ev. 678. 
